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Introduction 
Narratives are perhaps the most effective way to convey to new generations the 
traditions, knowledge and morals of a culture.  They are often used to influence 
present and future beliefs, as well as cultural norms. One present-day example is 
the spin placed on reports of the same events by different news outlets — contrast 
Al Jazeera and the New York Times — that serve to inflame opposing passions of 
the Arab and Western world. Consider also the history textbooks given to Israeli 
and Palestinian children, which differ significantly in their accounts of those 
peoples (Bar-On & Adwan 2006). Analyzing these phenomena by building formal 
models is an important step toward understanding how members of a culture might 
reason about the impact of internal and external events and actions, and therefore 
eventually mitigating and controlling the negative effects. Surprisingly, given the 
50-year history of Artificial Intelligence, there have been few research programs 
that have investigated narrative itself from a computational viewpoint. This first 
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workshop on computational approaches to understanding narrative had three main 
objectives: 
 Evaluate the “state-of the art” in modeling narrative 
 Explore the scope and dimensions of narrative itself 
 Begin to build a community focused on computational narrative 
To address these issues, an interdisciplinary group was assembled. Included were 
computer scientists, psychologists, linguists, media developers, philosophers, and 
story tellers (See Table 1 below.) Abstracts showing each individual’s perspectives 
were circulated prior to the workshop, and updated versions are included in 
Appendix 2.  
Presentations were organized into four groups, each followed by a panel discussion 
(See Appendix 1). On the morning after these presentations there was an extended 
discussion of issues related to narrative understanding and how computational 
approaches might foster insights and facilitate analyses. The sections that follow 
recap the main issues, potential advances, lacunae, and next steps to build a larger 
community.   
 
Nicholas Asher, University of Texas Henry Lieberman, MIT 
Neil Cohn, Tufts Terrence Lyons, AFOSR 
Michael Cox, DARPA Erik Mueller, IBM 
Mark Finlayson, MIT Srini Narayanan, ICSI and UC Berkeley 
Ken Forbus, Northwestern University Whitman Richards, MIT 
Pablo Gervás, Univ. Complutense de Madrid VS Subrahmanian, University of Maryland 
Jerry Hobbs, USC ISI Reid Swanson, USC ICT 
Ian Horswill, Northwestern University Emmet Tomai, University of Texas Pan American 
Ray Jackendoff, Tufts Bart Verheij, University of Groningen 
Jack Jackson, Naval Postgraduate School Patrick Winston, MIT 
Jay Keyser, MIT Michael Young, North Carolina State University 
Table 1: Workshop Participants 
Representations for Narrative 
Computational modeling requires a well-defined statement of the problem (or 
problems) to be solved.  An obvious first step, therefore, is to agree on what 
defines the character of narrative, or at the very least, to identify its boundaries. 
Classically, narrative is usually cast as a succession of happenings within a setting 
(or context), and a plot involving a set of characters. However, there are many 
different representations that could be invoked, especially if the narratives have 
quite different goals and objectives. These differences became quickly obvious: 
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most workshop participants came with a representation in mind that was tailored to 
their own specific research interests (even if it was only implicit). Despite these 
differences, however, there were some common elements. 
Consider Verheij’s representation of a narrative shown in Figure 1. This figure 
embodies what might be considered the kernel of all the narrative representations 
considered.  At the top, the large arrow represents the main progression of the 
story: a linear set of events that proceeds, one after another, from start to finish.  
Beneath that arrow are smaller arrows, representing smaller portions of the story 
that could be considered as stories in their own right.  This nesting can proceed 
quite far, until, finally, the stories ground out in some common-sense knowledge of 
the world, suggesting connections between argumentative and narrative elements 
(Bex et al. 2007, Bex, Prakken & Verheij 2007). 
 
Figure 1: Verheij’s visualization of hierarchical narrative grounded in common-sense, 
adapted from the representation of Wagenaar, Van Koppen and Crombag (1993) 
Hence, to first order, there are three common denominators amongst 
representations considered: (1) narratives have to do with sequences of events, (2) 
narratives have hierarchical structure, and (3) they are (eventually) grounded in a 
commonsense knowledge of the world.  
That the event sequences may be in some sense non-linear is illustrated by 
Gervás’s depiction, shown in Figure 2.  There, consider the short pieces of text on 
the left to be abstract “discourse segments” used to construct a narrative.  On the 
right, the relationship between actors for each action segment are displayed 
progressively at each major time step.  
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Figure 2: Gervás’s representation of the multiple points of view of narratives 
The representation on the right is one way of capturing the major event structure of 
a narrative, and is especially important when considering that the same story may 
be told from multiple points of view.  This points out an interesting computational 
problem, namely, to reconstruct the structure shown on the right from the discourse 
segments shown on the left. 
With these major characteristics of narrative in mind, we emphasize that all are 
independent of lexically-based language.  Cohn made this point forcibly with his 
examination of the narrative structures within a form that can be purely visual: the 
visual language used in comics.  This visual language conveys complex sequences 
of events, can have hierarchical constituency structure (as illustrated in Figure 3), 
structural ambiguities, head/modifier relationships, and involve multiple characters 
and points of view. This visual language can tell a story without ever using a single 
word.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of hierarchical structure within a purely visual medium (Cohn 2009) 
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From these fairly non-controversial starting points researchers expanded in 
multiple directions. For example, Verheij elaborated Figure 1 to provide a scheme 
for modeling legal narratives. This requires an analysis of the details of narrative: 
how evidence is assembled and presented before a judge and jury.  To convince a 
jury to convict a defendant, a prosecutor must deliver a well-formed narrative, with 
the assembled components nailed down, and with reasons for the various acts made 
compelling.   Verheij illustrated how a Wigmore chart (show in Figure 4) can be 
used to analyze which parts of a narrative support, explain, or contradict – in other 
words, how the different parts fit together. 
 
 
Figure 4: A chart (from Wigmore 1931) that shows how different parts of the prosecution’s 
narrative (for a particular charge of murder) support each other 
 
Taking yet another direction, Mueller’s aim was to build machines for narrative 
understanding, as verified by questions answering (Mueller 2003, 2004, 2007).  To 
do this, his process, illustrated in the flowchart in Figure 5, relies on a detailed, 
axiom-based commonsense knowledge base coupled with a logic theorem prover. 
Mueller’s approach emphasizes that story understanding builds on implicit as well 
as explicit knowledge possessed by the listener. In the Three Little Pigs story, for 
example, one knows that a house of straw is fragile compared with one built of 
bricks, and a wolf is already assumed to be predatory. Clearly, if a story is to be 
“understood” then the implications of the events and their sequences should be 
recoverable, even if these implications are not explicitly mentioned.  
Hobbs also tackles the story at this level of understanding, casting story 
understanding not as theorem proving, but as abductive inference to a plan that 
best explains the story (Hobbs 1990, Chapter 2).  Hobbs’s view is that the 
characters in the story are cognitive agents engaged in planning mechanisms; 
namely, that they are trying to achieve goals in the face of some obstacles, and  
 6
 
Figure 5: Flowchart of Mueller’s story understanding process 
proceed to break the main goal into subgoals, and those subgoals into further 
subgoals, and so forth, until a sequence of achievable actions leads to the desired 
outcome.  The agents operate in an uncertain, partially-obscured world, as we do, 
and so must monitor the state of the world and adjust to keep their plans on track.  
Young’s approach on narrative generation is related (see Figure 6). The problem is 
adapting a pre-constructed narrative (for, say, a computer game) to a player’s 
unpredictable actions (Young 2007). Interestingly, analysis at such a detailed level 
has opened up an avenue toward customizing aspects of the “suspense” of the 
narrative.  If one takes into account that narrative follows natural Gricean 
conditions, like any communicative text, then you can reveal or conceal 
information to increase the suspense.  
A few discussed work on moving toward more abstract, generalized 
representations, as opposed to a more refined, detailed analysis. Forbus and 
Tomai’s approach to reasoning with moral narratives used, for one branch of their 
reasoning system, analogical transfer and generalization.  These processes take into 
account the higher-level structural similarities between two stories, and try to 
transfer consequents from one to the other causal structure. Narayanan and 
Lieberman also stressed the role of common sense. Narayanan discussed the role of 
physical knowledge and frame semantics (see Figure 11 and Loenneker-Rodman & 
Narayanan 2010, Feldman & Narayanan 2004, Feldman 2006) whereas Lieberman 
was relying on OpenMind (Kim, Picard, & Lieberman 2008).  
Finlayson’s work expands on the constraints imposed by the higher-level structure. 
The approach is to derive the high-level structure by comparing, contrasting, and 
merging a large set of stories (Finlayson 2009). The structures that result are 
Propp-like morphologies that encode a finite state grammar – an example is shown 
in Figure 7.  Note that one use of this representation is to make vivid the higher- 
Story text
Information extraction
system
Problem builder
Commonsense Discrete Event Calculus
knowledge base Reasoner
Model
Question generation
and answering
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level analogies, specifically the similarities and differences between stories – an 
important component of cultural reasoning.  
Despite the relative few working on the “higher-level” representation of narrative, 
all agreed that this was an extremely important area to concentrate on.  Mueller 
noted that the first thing he would work on, if the complexity of reasoning over his 
knowledge bases were overcome, would be to get at the nature of the story more,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Example of a plan fragment, meant to be a part of a larger story-plan structure 
(Young 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: An example narrative morphology, illustrating a level of description higher than 
an individual story (Finlayson 2009) 
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and explore representations by Shank, Dyer, Lehnert and others that treat the story 
at the more abstract level. Asher was emphatic that isolating and understanding the 
higher-level structure was one of the primary motivations for doing low-level 
annotation.  
As can be seen, most of the representations agreed on a few fundamental points.  
First, event structure was generally accorded a central place.  Second, most every 
representation had the facility to represent hierarchical structures in some form.  
Third, almost every representation or model included, either implicitly or 
explicitly, commonsense knowledge.  From this common ground there was 
divergence.  Some focused on the microstructure of narratives, e.g., the axiomatic 
commonsense knowledge, planning structures, argument structures, or physical 
commonsense knowledge.  Others focused on macrostructure, such as at the causal 
level, a generalized plot unit level, or at the level of unified meaning. 
In sum, the principal obstacles to defining narrative in a manner suitable for 
computational studies – or toward a theory of narrative – came not from a 
disagreement about core structures at play. Rather, the differences came in the 
goals of the narrative, how these different goals impacted the representation, and  
whether, and in what way, micro- and macro-levels should be represented and 
used. 
Dimensions of Narrative 
The second major issue addressed by the workshop participants was the nature of 
narrative, its scope, and which types of narratives warranted study. Table 2 lists 
types of narratives mentioned during the workshop, split into somewhat arbitrary 
categories.  
Formal Somewhat Formal Traditional Informal / Spontaneous
Novels 
Movies 
Biography 
Plays 
Case studies 
Legal Argument 
Some poetry 
Blogs 
Computer games 
Comics 
News 
Sitcoms 
Folktales 
Fairy Tales 
Fables 
Fabula 
Myths 
Legends 
Anecdotes 
Diaries  
Gossip  
Some jokes 
Water-cooler talk 
Urban legends 
 
Table 2: Selection of types of narratives mentioned at the workshop 
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The purpose of the table is not to lay out a precise ontology of narrative, but rather 
to illustrate the range of phenomena that should be considered.  There are those 
artifacts that sprung to everyone’s mind immediately on the word narrative: 
objects that fall into more formal categories, like novels, plays, or news. But, as 
Horswill pointed out, it is helpful to keep in mind other sorts of exemplars of a less 
formal, and more spontaneous sort, such as diaries, gossip, or water-cooler talk.  
These are also narratives, and perhaps form the main bulk of people’s experience 
with narratives from day-to-day.  
Clearly, with such a range of genre, narratives have many dimensions. First and 
foremost is the event structure, namely, narratives are about something happening. 
Second, there was the narrative structure. Most participants thought event 
structure was distinct and separable from narrative structure. But the group could 
not achieve consensus on what structures made something a narrative.  For 
example, Hobbs presented chronicles, which are rolls of unrelated events, and said 
they were perfectly well-formed lists, but not narratives.  To counter this, Keyser 
brought up the example of picaresque novels, which are just a series of unrelated 
adventures of a single character, and noted that most sitcoms are just reduced 
forms of the picaresque novel.  Jackendoff, to second the observation, noted that in 
music, variation movements don’t have much of a broad “narrative arc” like other 
forms, but are a musical form of the picaresque novel. 
The next most important dimension, from the point of view of the discussion, was 
the purpose of a narrative.  Narratives can be used for many things, for 
entertainment, for argumentation, for political propaganda (e.g., Lakoff 2008), etc.  
It was noted by Asher that often the purpose of the narrative is orthogonal to the 
structure of the narrative itself. To illustrate this point, he contrasted a novel, which 
might use indirection, misinformation and surprise to achieve its goals, with a legal 
argument (as discussed by Verheij) that should be straightforward, matter-of-fact, 
common-sensical and lacking in surprise to achieve its goal of overcoming a 
reasonable doubt. Consider also the goal of conveying moral issues via a story, or 
through mythical analogy versus the goal of telling a joke, or perhaps more 
extreme, a scientific account of the evolution of homo-sapiens, or of a “brain”. In 
each of these examples, the knowledge and reasoning abilities required differ 
considerably. Related to the purpose was the idea of the function of narrative in 
different societies: Horswill proposed that the main function of narrative was to 
mediate individual and group identity.  Jackendoff countered that, however, if you 
look across the whole range of narrative examples, you find many different 
functions. 
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Fourthly, the role of the listener must be addressed. As noted by Cox, the narrator 
must be tuned to the abilities and interests of the listener if he wants to achieve his 
purpose. How the story is presented (i.e., with explanatory remarks of footnotes, 
etc.) may need to be revised depending upon who is listening. Additional media 
might be introduced – for example, handouts in a lecture versus an unadorned 
reading of a poem.  
Related to the above, Horswill pointed out a dimension that was little treated at the 
workshop, the issue of the emotional impact of the narrative on the listener. 
Subrahmanian stressed this dimension as well, noting it was especially important 
in light of the varied purposes to which one might apply a narrative. He gave the 
example of trying to write a book today on a well-tread subject, say, for example, 
the Rwandan genocide.  To make the book “worth reading by anybody”, it would 
need to say a lot more than just particular things occurred at particular times, be 
more than just a list of events.  It would need to argue, hypothesize, speculate, 
surprise, suggest; it would have to deal not only with events as they happened but 
possible events and states of the world; it would have to be the right length so as to 
not bore the listener, but not leave them dissatisfied. 
Also lightly tread, but still mentioned, was the medium of the narrative. While 
there was general consensus with Cohn’s view that narratives are not tied to lexical 
forms,  it was often noted that a change in the medium results in a change in the 
narrative. The workshop participants felt that these “details” and issues were 
critical, but had a very difficult time articulating how exactly this particular 
dimension should inform computational models. 
Finally, Keyser several times emphasized the importance of the meaning of the 
narrative – the narrative arc. No representation specifically addressed this point, 
namely what a story means – its moral or overall message. In a related point, Asher 
raised the issue of how the nature of the message might recast the narrative 
framework.  
Hence the general consensus was that computational studies should explore a range 
of media, with narratives of different genre and goals. To this end, there was a 
strong recommendation that the present computationally-oriented community 
present at the workshop should be expanded (see below.) 
Fundamental Problems 
In the preceding sections, three main problems were addressed: why narrative?, 
what constitutes narrative?, and what are the appropriate representations?  While 
the discussion in the report sketched potential answers to these questions, many 
issues remain. 
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Why narrative? There was substantial discussion of what makes narrative 
important and worthy of study.  As Horswill and Jackendoff pointed out, 
participants were unable to give a concise and cogent reason why narrative itself 
should be an object of study, rather than a variety of other cognitive or social 
processes.  Each participant had their own specific examples of applications and 
interests, but there was no over-arching, knock-down reason.  Participants 
generally agreed with Cohn’s assertion that narrative is a ubiquitous way to 
structure, package or order information such that we can understand it, while 
disagreeing as to whether narrative itself was an epiphemenon of some deeper 
process, say, analogy (Forbus), planning (Hobbs), or social interaction (Horswill).  
Tomai noted that narrative seems to be a form especially well suited for 
communicating complex sequences of events over a low-bandwidth channel, by 
taking into careful account different constraints of language and context.  But all of 
these observations still beg the question of what is special about narrative in 
particular – there are many ways of structuring information without it being a 
narrative. 
What exactly is narrative? Hand in hand with the previous problem, although 
numerous examples and dimensions were identified, no one was able to truly 
define what a narrative is, to give a procedure for distinguishing good narratives 
from bad, or distinguish narratives from non-narratives. Keyser asserted that a 
good narrative is one which is “about something”, something that can be extremely 
simply stated.  Hobbs and Gervás countered that often a critical view of literature 
holds that the more interpretations a text has, the better. Jackson recounted that this 
was the explicit technique taken by the script writers for the recent popular 
television show Battlestar Galactica: that they tried to keep it as open-ended as 
possible. Verheij noted that in legal psychology it has been suggested that 
consistency, non-ambiguity, and chronological ordering make a story better in the 
sense that stories with these properties are more quickly believed to be true.   
What are the appropriate representations for narrative?  Here too we are left in an 
incomplete state.  It is clear from the survey that no presented representation or 
system spanned the whole range of narrative levels identified, and there was no 
attempt or even a sketch of a unified representation or representational 
architecture. Cohn notes that this lack of unified models may be because the 
answer to the question of representation is, at least in part, conditioned on the 
answer to the previous question, namely, our understanding of what narrative is.  
Nevertheless some first steps were taken to address these issues: the MoralDM 
system (Dehghani et al. 2008), presented during Forbus’s talk, integrates 
representations at levels both above and below the generally-accepted event 
structure middle level.  For the level below, they used first-principles reasoning 
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(bottom branch in Figure 8), and for the level above, causal reasoning by analogy 
(top branch). 
 
Figure 8: The MoralDM architecture, reasoning at both the detailed (lower branch) and 
abstract (upper branch) levels 
Facets of understanding narrative: Putting aside both the representation and 
narrative definition issues, an extended discussion of what would be required for 
full understanding of narrative raised the following sets of questions: 
(i) What makes narratives different from a list of events, or facts?  
Jackendoff hammered on this point throughout the conference: what is it 
about the structure of narrative that makes it cohere?  Asher asked too, 
what is special about the arrangement of the items in the discourse that 
makes it a narrative, rather than something else? 
(ii) Forbus asked if understanding narrative first requires us to understand 
common-sense reasoning? Verheij asked about the effect of small 
changes in the story for its use and interpretation, noting that logic-based 
AI is traditionally quite sensitive to initial conditions.  
(iii) How are stories indexed and retrieved?  Is there a “universal” scheme for 
encoding episodes? (Jackendoff made here an analogy to the idea in 
language of Chomsky’s universal grammar)  
(iv) Jackendoff asked if the composition of the narrative is more dependent 
on its purpose, or rather on the understanding of the underlying event 
structure? The purpose, function, and genre of a narrative seems to have 
an enormous impact on the form and content of the story – what are those 
impacts?  Does the genre of the story change not only the surface form, 
but the underlying representations used? 
(v) Asher and Keyser in particular asked how moral decisions and content 
relate to narrative structure.  Are their systematic differences in the 
formal properties of narratives from different cultures? 
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(vi) Keyser asked what is the number of narrative arcs?  What are the 
possible story lines? Is conflict almost always in ingredient? Is there a 
recipe, such as Campbell’s Hero’s Journey, or a Proppian morphology 
such as derived by Finlayson? An argument against this view was raised 
– namely if the listener’s stance must be included in the design of a story, 
then the many factors come into play, including genre and generation, 
etc. At an even higher level of abstraction, Keyser pointed out that no 
representation discussed or implied at the workshop dealt with what a 
story means, in the sense that War and Peace is about “people’s inability 
to control events,” or Don Quixote’s true message is that “to fully enjoy 
life you have to be a little crazy.” 
(vii) What does the microstructure and macrostructure of a narrative look like? 
Are these representations unique? How is narrative structure different 
from discourse or rhetorical structure? 
(viii) Where does the narrative technique of characterization fit in these 
schemes?  Tomai noted that there was much discussion of two of the 
classical parts of narrative, namely, plot and setting, but very little about 
the third, character. 
(ix) What are the representations that underlie the extraction of schema from 
the blooming, buzzing confusion of the world?  Induction from raw 
experience seems difficult, and Narayanan speculated that some of the 
mechanisms are built-in and evolutionarily quite old, e.g., the idea of 
‘starting’ and ‘stopping’ as a bootstrapping mechanism for extracting 
events from experience.  What are the cognitive principles that permit 
listeners to assign schematic structures to heard narratives?  What aspects 
of these structures and principles are specific to narrative, and what 
aspects come from general-purpose cognition (or elsewhere)?  Winston 
asked if the full comprehension of a narrative requires internal pictorial 
images. 
(x)  How is the listener convinced that a story is true? A common case is 
when one is trying to evaluate different, conflicting accounts of real 
events presented by news media. It is clear that the current computational 
work in legal arguments and narrative is relevant, where testimonies 
often conflict. If a story (or argument) is compelling, to what extent (and 
why) might false accounts be perceived as truthful? Lyons was 
particularly concerned about narratives with respect to the confirmation 
bias – he noted this is a concern not only for legal argument, but for 
medical reports or strategic reasoning.  
 14
(xi) How do stories help drive decision-making? Analogy is the clearest 
computational route, but are there others?  Lieberman asked how one 
reasons by analogy with conflicting precedents, and Gervás asked what 
one does when different aspects of structure within the same story 
conflict.  Jackson noted that if you have multiple analogies, when you 
decide on a course of action (because of other information), you can 
justify your choice with the corresponding analogy.  Verheij’s work in 
particular bears on how narratives affect decisions, since the narratives 
the defense and prosecution tell directly influence the judgment they 
issue. 
(xii) What insights do narratives give about causality? How do stories help us 
deal with or structure our world?  How do we extract causal models from 
narratives?   
(xiii) How do we evaluate computational models and themes of narrative? 
Questions and answers? Ability to generate compelling stories?   If 
evaluation is to be against a databank of stories, then what should be the 
normal form for stories? Just how will restrictions on annotation affect 
the ability to find analogies, similarities, etc? 
(xiv) Narrative structure aside, what makes a “good” story? (Keyser)  How 
does the judgment of “good” depend on the genre or purpose of the 
story?  Why do we like stories? 
Steps for the Future 
Two initiatives were applauded by all: (1) a second workshop in one year and (2) a 
story data base, analogous to the Penn Treebank used for evaluating statistical 
parsers.  
Second Workshop:  Unanimously, the participants agreed that the workshop was a 
boost to understanding narrative, by bringing together a variety of approaches, 
showing links and differences. It was felt that the community was fragmented, and 
needed to be encouraged and grown.  Many of the participants had not previously 
met, and consequently a variety of perspectives and approaches were new to large 
segments of this small group. Hence the workshop was an important first step to 
creating a community of researchers studying narrative from a computational 
viewpoint.  A second workshop would be the obvious net step toward establishing 
a larger, still broader community. We visualize the next workshop as doubling in 
size, and including several areas not represented, such as game-theory approaches 
to narrative, studies of gossip and rumor, and especially narrative theory 
researchers from the humanities.  More thought is also needed to reach an 
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agreement on methods for evaluating story understanding, as well as various 
experimental paradigms. In addition to broadening the scope of participants, a 
second workshop is needed to investigate whether a new community should be set 
up (with its own annual meetings and publication vehicles), or if, as Winston 
suggested, the participants are naturally a subset of an already established 
community.  In particular, it should be investigated whether the participants feel a 
publication venue directly associated with the area would be appropriate. 
Catalogue of Problems and Applications: Richards suggested that a list of potential 
applications of narrative – big problems on which narrative might give one traction 
– would be of great use to motivating work and securing funding.  While this effort 
may not have to have its own separate committee, it was thought that some 
attention should be paid to assembling such a list.  A few candidates for inclusion 
were offered: 
1. Using narrative to filter incoming information, to interpret it, impose a 
structure on it, all sensitive to your goals (Cox) 
2. Detection and production of propaganda (Winston) 
3. Understanding and influencing other cultures (Richards, Jackson) 
4. Helping others tell their own stories, say, for entertainment purposes (your 
summer vacation) or institutional knowledge capture (Lieberman, Cox) 
Data Bank: The majority of participants were engaged in computational 
approaches to text based story understanding. At present, there is no shared 
corpora of stories – a necessary tool if one is to compare successes and strengths of 
various approaches. Hence it was proposed to create a story databank.  
One important property of the story databank would be to provide at least one 
translation of text into an agreed-upon format, such as Finlayson’s set of semantic 
annotations or Asher’s discourse representations. It was generally agreed that this 
annotation is an extremely time consuming and delicate process, no matter if done 
manually (e.g., Cohn, Mueller, Asher), automatically (Forbus and Tomai), or semi-
automatically (Finlayson).  Gervás noted that the assembly of a corpus had been 
discussed quite a bit in the story generation field, but beyond agreeing that a corpus 
would be useful, there was no agreement on what exactly to put in the corpus or 
how it was to be represented. Hobbs expressed grave concerns that to get high 
inter-annotator agreement any representations for such a corpus would have to be 
too simple to be helpful.   
The general consensus, though, was that, despite the difficulties, there should be 
some attempt to make a story databank.  Fortunately, the Story Workbench 
(Finlayson 2008), ideally in concert with Tomai’s EA NLU system (Tomai & 
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Forbus 2009), will shortly be ready to provide such a translation of stories into a 
form more suitable for computational analysis modeling. Narayanan also 
mentioned that FrameNet from Berkeley might be of use, as it already has small 
numbers of short, frame-annotated stories  
The story databank will not only need the stories themselves and their formal 
representations, but formal representations of evaluation metrics.  One type of 
metric that is immediately accessible are the question answering metrics used by 
Mueller, and it was suggested that the story databank include lists of questions 
(with answer keys) that a story understanding system should be able to answer.  
But more thought needs to be put into different types of metrics that might be used. 
Another element that possibly could be included in the databank would be a 
heterogeneous set of resources that can be used to generate narratives, potentially 
in multiple different media. 
This effort will be led by Gervás, with a tentative committee that includes at the 
very least, Mueller, Verheij and Finlayson. 
 17
Bibliography   
Asher, N. (1993). Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse. Dordrecht, Kluwer 
Academic Press. 
Asher, N. and A. Lascarides (2003). Logics of Conversation. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bar-On, D. and S. Adwan (2006). The Psychology of Better Dialogue between 
Two Separate but Interdependent Narratives. Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of 
Conflict: History's Double Helix. R. I. Rotberg. Bloomington, Indiana University 
Press: 205-224. 
Bex, F. J., Braak, S. W. v. d., Oostendrop, H. v., Prakken, H., Verheij, B., & 
Vreeswijk, G. (2007). “Sense-making software for crime investigation: how to 
combine stories and arguments?” Law, Probability, and Risk, 6, 145-168.  
Bex, F. J., Prakken, H., & Verheij, B. (2007). Formalizing argumentative story-
based analysis of evidence, Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference 
on Artificial Intelligence and Law (pp. 1-10). New York: ACM Press. 
Chwe, M. S.-Y. (2009). "Rational Choice and the Humanities: Excerpts and 
Folktales." Occasion 1(1): http://occasion.stanford.edu/node/9. 
Cohn, N. (2009). Foundations of Visual Language Grammar. 
Cox, M. and A. Ram (1999). On the intersection of story understanding and 
learning. Understanding language understanding : computational models of 
reading. A. Ram and K. Moorman. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press / Bradford Books: 
397-434. 
Dehghani, M., E. Tomai, K.D. Forbus, and M. Klenk (2008). An Integrated 
Reasoning Approach to Moral Decision-Making. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third 
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. (held in Chicago, IL), Menlo Park, CA, 
AAAI Press: 1280-1286. 
Fayzullin, M., V. S. Subrahmanian, M. Albanese, C. Cesarano, and An. Picariello. 
(2007). "Story Creation from Heterogeneous Data Sources." Multimedia Tools and 
Applications 33: 351-377. 
Feldman, J. (2006). From Molecule to Metaphor. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
Feldman, J. and S. Narayanan (2004). "Embodied meaning in a neural theory of 
language." Brain and Language 89: 385-392. 
Finlayson, M. A. (2008). Collecting Semantics in the Wild: The Story Workbench. 
Naturally Inspired Artificial Intelligence (Technical Report FS-08-06, Papers from 
 18
the AAAI Fall Symposium). (held in Arlington, VA), Menlo Park, CA, AAAI 
Press. 
Finlayson, M. A. (2009). Deriving Narrative Morphologies via Analogical Story 
Merging. New Frontiers in Analogy Research (Proceedings of the Second 
International Conference on Analogy). (held in Sofia, Bulgaria), Sofia, New 
Bulgarian University Press: 127-136. 
Gervás, P. (2009). "Computational Approaches to Storytelling and Creativity." AI 
Magazine 30: 63-70. 
Hobbs, J. R. (1990). Literature and Cognition. CSLI Lecture Notes, Number 21. 
Center for the Study of Language and Information. 
Horswill, I. (2007). Psychopathology, Narrative, and Cognitive Architecture. 
Intelligent Narrative Technologies (Technical Report FS-07-05, Papers from the 
AAAI Fall Symposium). (held in Arlington, VA), Menlo Park, CA, AAAI Press. 
Jackson, L. A. (2009). Narrative Paradigm in Cultural Geography Modeling. 
Proceedings of the Human Behavior-Computational Modeling and Interoperability 
Conference. (held at Oak Ridge National Laboratory). 
Kim, K., R. W. Picard, and H. Lieberman (2008). Common Sense Assistant for 
Writing Stories that Teach Social Skills. Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth ACM 
Conference on Computers and Human Interaction. (held in Florence, Italy), New 
York, ACM Press: 2805-2810. 
Lakoff, G. (2008). The Political Mind. New York, Viking Press. 
Lascarides, A. and N. Asher (2007). Segmented Discourse Representation Theory: 
Dynamic Semantics with Discourse Structure. Computing Meaning. H. Bunt and 
R. Muskens. Amsterdam, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 3: 87-124. 
Loenneker-Rodman, B. and S. Narayanan (2010). Computational Approaches to 
Figurative Language. Cambridge Encyclopedia of Psycholinguistics. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Mueller, E. T. (2003). Story understanding through multi-representational model 
construction. Proceedings of the HLT-NAACL Workshop on Text Meaning. G. 
Hirst and S. Nirenburg. East Stroudsburg, PA, ACL Press: 46-53. 
Mueller, E. T. (2004). "Understanding script-based stories using commonsense 
reasoning." Cognitive Systems Research 5: 307-340. 
Mueller, E. T. (2007). "Modeling space and time in narratives about restaurants." 
Literary and Linguistic Computing 22: 67-84. 
 19
Swanson, R. and A. S. Gordon (2008). Say anything: A massively collaborative 
open domain story writing companion. Proceedings of the First International 
Conference on Interactive Digital Storytelling (Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Vol. 5334). (held in Erfurt, Germany), Berlin, Springer: 32-40. 
Tomai, E. and K. D. Forbus (2009). EA NLU: Practical Language Understanding 
for Cognitive Modeling. Proceedings of the 22nd International Florida Artificial 
Intelligence Research Society Conference. (held at Sanibel Island, FL), Menlo 
Park, CA, AAAI Press. 
Verheij, B. (2005). Virtual Arguments: On the Design of Argument Assistants for 
Lawyers and Other Arguers. The Hague, The Netherlands, TMC Asser Press. 
Wagenaar, W. H., P. J. van Koppen, and H.F.M. Crombag (1993). Anchored 
Narratives: The Psychology of Criminal Evidence. New York, St. Martin's Press. 
Wigmore, J. H. (1931). The Principles of Judicial Proof. 2nd Ed., Boston, Little, 
Brown and Company. 
Young, R. M. (2007). "Story and discourse: A bipartite model of narrative 
generation in virtual worlds." Interaction Studies 8: 177-208. 
 20
Appendix 1: Meeting Agenda 
Thursday, October 8 
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7:00  Dinner 
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8:30 – 9:00 Opening Remarks, Whitman Richards & Patrick Winston, MIT 
9:00 – 9:20 Erik Mueller, IBM 
9:20 – 9:40 Mark Finlayson, MIT 
9:40 – 10:00 Neil Cohn, TuftsUniversity 
10:00 – 10:30 Discussion Panel Nicholas Asher, University of Texas 
Bart Verheij, University of Groningen 
Patrick Winston moderating + session speakers 
10:30 – 11:00 Break 
11:00 – 11:20 Srini Narayanan, University of California at Berkeley and ICSI 
11:20 – 11:40 Reid Swanson, University of Southern California ICT 
11:40 – 12:00 Ken Forbus, Northwestern University 
12:00 – 12:30 Discussion Panel Henry Lieberman, MIT 
Ian Horswill, Northwestern University 
Whitman Richards moderating + session speakers 
12:30 – 2:00 Lunch 
2:00 – 2:20 Michael Young, North Carolina State University 
2:20 – 2:40 Pablo Gervás, Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
2:40 – 3:00 Discussion Panel Ian Horswill, Northwestern University 
Emmett Tomai, University of Texas Pan American 
Whitman Richards moderating + session speakers 
3:00 – 3:30 Break 
3:30 – 3:50 VS Subrahmanian, University of Maryland 
3:50 – 4:10 Bart Verheij, University of Groningen 
4:10 – 4:30 Jerry Hobbs, University of Southern California  ISI 
4:30 – 5:30 Discussion Panel Michael Cox, DARPA 
Patrick Winston moderating + session speakers 
5:30 – 7:00 Cocktails 
7:00 Dinner Jay Keyser, MIT 
  
  
Saturday, October 10 
8:30 – 9:00 Opening Remarks 
9:00 – 10:30 Discussion 
10:30 – 11:00 Break 
11:00 – 12:00 Discussion 
12:00 – 12:30 Closing Remarks 
12:30 – 2:00 Lunch 
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Appendix 2: Participant Abstracts 
Nicholas Asher, Department of Philosophy, University of Texas 
What is narrative?  One possibility is that a narrative is just a text with discourse 
structure; but texts without events certainly have discourse structure, but clearly 
stories without events are rare. 
I claim narrative is a particular genre or type of discourse. To understand the 
species, we must understand the genus with the hope of isolating, if not necessary 
and sufficient properties, at least prototypical properties that individuate narrative 
from other genres.  Discourse is a structured linguistic object. Discourse structure 
resembles syntactic structure in that it is recursively constructed from what my 
colleagues and I call elementary discourse units or EDUs, which are linked 
together by discourse relations. Linked EDUs can serve to construct complex 
constituents that are also linked by discourse structure. (1) provides an example of 
the hierarchical structure induced by discourse relations and the recursive 
construction process. 
(1) (a) (π1) John had a great evening last night. 
 (b) (π2) He had a great meal. 
 (c) (π3) He ate salmon. 
 (d) (π4) He devoured lots of cheese. 
 (e) (π5) He then won a dancing competition 
Statements (1c-1d) provide ‘more detail’ about the event in (1b), which itself 
elaborates on (1a).  Statement (1e) continues the elaboration of John’s evening that 
(1b) started, forming a narrative with it (temporal progression). The ordering of 
events does not follow the order of sentences, but rather obeys the constraints 
imposed by discourse structure, as shown graphically below. Thus the eventualities 
that are understood as elaborating on others are temporally subordinate to them, 
and those events that represent narrative continuity are understood as following 
each other. A theory like Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT: 
Asher 1993, Asher and Lascarides 2003) provides the discourse structure for (1) 
above in for Figure 9 below, which provides a proper temporal structure for the 
text and has several other effects on content. The elements π6 and π7 in the figure 
are complex discourse constituents created by the process of inferring the discourse 
structure (Asher and Lascarides 2003). 
Within this framework of a view about discourse, we can ask what is a narrative. It 
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is also be a particular kind of structured object. But it is not simply a sequence of 
EDUs linked by Narration, but more something like the structure given in (1). I 
advocate an empirical approach to an investigation of this genre: by annotating 
paradigm examples of narratives, I hope that certain general structural patterns and 
or intentional structures will emerge that will serve to characterize the genre. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The SDRT structure for (1). 
Neil Cohn, Department of Psychology, Tufts University 
Foundations for a Visual Language Grammar Drawing joins speech and 
gestures as one of only three ways in which humans can express concepts. Like 
those forms, the visual-graphic form can also be put into discrete sequences that 
requires a degree of fluency for comprehension and production, and emerges in a 
variety of socio-cultural contexts, from modern day “comics” to native Australian 
sand narratives. I argue that the understanding of sequential images is guided by a 
hierarchic generative grammar that is structured with similar principles as 
language, with grammatical categories, recursion, distance dependencies, structural 
ambiguities, and grammatical constructions. Throughout, the foundations will be 
laid for a theoretical model of this “visual language” narrative grammar, 
establishing the basic issues involved and concerns posed to future research. 
Mark A. Finlayson, CSAIL, MIT  
Deriving Narrative Morphologies via Analogical Story Merging It has long 
been suspected that stories drawn from the same cultural setting share important 
narrative structure. One example of such structure, first identified by Vladimir 
Propp in 1928, is the morphology of a set of stories, which describes the set of plot 
elements and their allowed sequences. Until now, the extraction of morphologies 
has remained a manual task, the purview of anthropological virtuosos (e.g., Propp, 
Lévi-Strauss, Dundes, Campbell); reproduction or validation of their analyses is a 
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time-consuming, prohibitively difficult endeavor. I use a technique called 
Analogical Story Merging that derives a morphology given a set of stories. It 
incorporates standard techniques for computing analogies as well as a method 
called Bayesian Model Merging for inducing a grammar from a corpus of positive 
examples. The output of the basic implementation has been applied to a small 
example story corpus, a set of summaries of Shakespearean plays. 
Kenneth D. Forbus, Department of Computer Science, Northwestern 
University 
Analogy and Narrative: Modeling Human Decision-making  A growing body 
of evidence in cognitive science suggests that analogical processing is one of the 
core operations of human cognition.  Analogy is powerful because it enables 
particular experiences to be used to reason about, and make decisions in, novel 
situations, as well as learn generalizations at human-like rates.  Narratives can be 
viewed as a distillation of experience, providing a source of guidance even for 
situations one has not directly experienced.  The key idea involves “structure-
mapping” and how it can be used to model aspects of moral decision-making 
presented as a story. Our work so far suggests that the combination of analogy and 
narrative may provide a useful new methodology for modeling cultural influences 
on reasoning. (Joint research with Morteza Dehghani and Emmett Tomai.) 
Pablo Gervás, Department of Software Engineering and Artificial 
Intelligence, Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
Story Generation: Composing and Inventing Stories A story can be thought of 
as a linear discourse that tells about a set of events that take place at more than one 
location over a number of time periods and involve several characters. If this set 
were mapped on a space-time grid, it will most probably not look linear at all. 
When causal relationships between different events are considered, a complex 
interconnected graph results. A fundamental subtask of the storytelling process is 
how the non-linear set of events gets mapped onto a linear discourse. Empirical 
observations of human-made stories indicate that causal relationships play an 
important role in structuring and organizing the story, but they are often not 
mentioned explicitly. Rather, they are left for the reader to infer. A very important 
ingredient when attributing merit to a story seems to be related to the number of 
such implicit causal relations that can be inferred when reading it. Our research 
over recent years focuses on three key issues traditionally overlooked by story 
generators: how stories come to be linear when they refer to complex clouds of 
events unevenly distributed over space and time (discourse planning), what role 
does the process of interpretation expected of the reader play in story composition 
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(reader models), and the development of algorithms capable of generating different 
new stories in each run (creative storytelling). 
Jerry Hobbs, ISI, University of Southern California 
Narrative and Planning In the Strong AI paradigm, people are viewed, in part, as 
planning mechanisms.  We have the general goal to thrive, and we continually 
construct, execute, monitor and modify a plan to achieve that goal, using our 
beliefs about what kinds of actions tend to cause what kinds of results, including 
the result of thriving. A narrative is an account of such a planning mechanism 
attempting to achieve its goals in the face of obstacles.  The unique power of 
narrative derives from the fact that it presents a course of events in very much the 
way we, as dynamic planning mechanisms, experience them in our own lives. 
Several very short stories illustrate this perspective.  They reveal the central 
importance of the intersection of ontology and natural language processing, 
namely, concepts related to causality and how they are realized in language, and 
concepts from an ontology of micro-sociology, expressing many of our most 
central concerns. 
Ian Horswill, Departments of EECS and Radio, Television, & Film, 
Northwestern University 
Modeling Mammalian Neuropsychology for Interactive Virtual Characters 
One of the primary differences between humans and other animals is our capacity 
for high level cognition and the use of language. Historically, AI has 
understandably focused on duplicating these aspects of human behavior, and 
selected its architectures accordingly.  However, humans are nevertheless social 
mammals and share a large part of the mammalian behavior repertoire, such as 
fight, flight, and feeding, as well as social behaviors, such as attachment, 
affiliation, territoriality, and the formation of dominance hierarchies. I argue that 
for all our unique capabilities, the mammalian behavior hardware (whatever it may 
be) is still active in humans, and that for applications such as virtual characters for 
interactive drama, we should begin from architectures based on our commonalities 
with other social mammals, rather than from our unique capabilities. 
Leroy A. “Jack” Jackson, Naval Postgraduate School 
The narrative paradigm serves to harmonize various human cultural, social, and 
behavioral theories in a cultural geography model under development by the US 
Army TRADOC Analysis Center and various partners. Walter Fisher's narrative 
paradigm contends that people are essentially storytellers, that all meaningful 
communication is a form of storytelling, and that the world is a set of stories from 
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which each individual chooses those that match his values and beliefs. The 
Cultural Geography model (Jackson 2009) is a prototype implementation of an 
agent based model of civilian populations in stability operations derived from 
social theory and military doctrine. U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine claims 
that the most important cultural form for commanders to understand in a conflict 
environment is the narrative. A cultural narrative is a story relating a causally 
linked set of events that explains some aspect a group's history and expresses the 
group's values, character, or self-identity. Members of a society express and absorb 
ideologies through narratives. Therefore, by attending to narratives, commanders 
can identify a society's or group's core values and begin to understand their 
methods of reasoning and their behaviors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: This is a conceptual overview of the cultural geography model and it 
components. We view the environment as a conflict ecosystem in which both the coalition 
forces and threat forces are components. The four main components of the model are (1) 
the civilian populace, (2) other actors within the model, (3) infrastructure objects, and (4) 
events that occur within the model (4). Narrative informs population entity identity and 
behavior, and the influence of events on population entities. 
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Samuel Jay Keyser, Department of Linguistics, MIT 
How to Write a Story, Sometimes Edgar Allan Poe’s essay “The Philosophy of 
Composition” begins with a quotation from a note by Charles Dickens:  
By the way, are you aware that Godwin wrote his Caleb Williams 
backwards? He first involved his hero in a web of difficulties, forming 
the second volume, and then, for the first, cast about him for some 
mode of accounting for what had been done. 
I cannot think this is the precise mode of procedure on the part of Godwin…but the 
author of Caleb Williams was too good an artist not to perceive the advantage 
derivable from at least a somewhat similar process. Nothing is more clear than that 
every plot, worth the name, must be elaborated to its dénouement before anything 
be attempted with the pen. It is only with the dénouement constantly in view that 
we can give a plot its indispensable air of consequence, or causation, by making 
the incidents, and especially the tone at all points, tend to the development of the 
intention. I will illustrate the truth of these observations with selections from a 
series of children’s poems published under the title The Pond God and Other 
Stories by Samuel Jay Keyser. 
Henry Lieberman, Media Laboratory, MIT 
Common sense reasoning for understanding and generating narrative  Since 
the earliest days of natural language understanding, researchers have realized the 
need for background Commonsense knowledge and Commonsense reasoning to 
fully understand or generate meaningful narrative content. There's simply not 
enough information explicit in narrative text to fully convey meaning.  For the past 
ten years, we have been collecting Commonsense knowledge from volunteers over 
the Web. The Open Mind Common Sense corpus contains over 1,000,000 
sentences in English (along with collections in other languages). It is "the 
Wikipedia version of Cyc". We have applied state-of-the-art parsing and created a 
semantic net, ConceptNet, that we believe represents roughly 1% of what the 
average person knows. We have a new reasoning technique, AnalogySpace, that is 
more suited to Commonsense inference than traditional logical reasoning. It can 
reason over an entire knowledge space at once, discovering the dimensions that 
best characterize the space. It can classify concepts according to those dimensions, 
create categories, or compute the plausibility of assertions. The tools are available 
open-source.  It has been applied to a myriad of tasks involving narrative, such as 
analysis of user opinions of software, and generative tasks, such as an intelligent 
video editor that selects clips based on their appropriateness for a story. 
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Erik T. Mueller, IBM Research 
Story Understanding through Model Finding My main interest is machine story 
understanding and how to build story understanding systems. Although my basic 
approach – building models of an input story – has remained stable, my method for 
building these models has changed. Initially, I used specific algorithms for 
understanding each domain (like space, time, goals, and emotions). Over time, 
however, I was led to my current approach of using efficient, general algorithms 
that operate on declarative knowledge. Changing my approach allowed me to scale 
up my systems from understanding 3 stories to understanding 107 stories and 
beyond. The key component is the Discrete Event Calculus Reasoner, which builds 
story models given a commonsense knowledge base and predicate-argument 
representations of story events and states. 
Srini Narayanan, Cognitive Science Program, UC Berkeley and ICSI 
Simulation semantics: A computational framework for exploring the links 
between language, cognition and action.  The UCB/ICSI NTL project is an 
ongoing attempt to model language behavior in a way that is both neurally 
plausible and computationally practical.  Work within the NTL project coupled 
with a variety of converging evidence from Cognitive Linguistics, Psychology and 
Neuroscience suggests that language understanding involves embodied enactment 
which we call “simulation semantics.” Simulation semantics hypothesizes the mind 
as “simulating” the external world while functioning in it.  The “simulation” takes 
noisy linguistic input together with general knowledge and makes new inferences 
to figure out what the input means and to guide response. Monitoring the state of 
the external world, drawing inferences, and acting jointly constitute a dynamic 
ongoing interactive process. My advance is a computational realization of a 
simulation semantics hypothesis, with preliminary results on applying the model to 
vexing problems in narrative interpretation. Specifically, the key notion is an 
implemented computational model of sensory-motor imagination combined with 
the ability for metaphoric projections which potentially explains the cross-cultural 
disposition to conceptualize abstract actions and events in terms of sensory-motor 
representations (consider for example the domain of economic events where 
economies stumble, lurch, speed up, slow down, sprint, crawl, move-ahead, turn 
around, reorient, gain a foothold, etc.). Results of the model and ongoing imaging 
and behavioral experiments will be described along with a new computational 
formalism called Embodied Construction Grammar (ECG) that supports a deep 
semantic analysis of narratives by integrating theories from construction grammar, 
frame semantics, and cognitive linguistics. 
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Figure 11: Narayanan's KARMA system exploits metaphoric projections of physical 
reasoning and simulation to interpret narratives about international politics and 
economics. 
V.S. Subrahmanian, Department of Computer Science, University of 
Maryland
Generating Succinct Stories Suppose you wanted to query the web with a query 
which said “Tell me the story of Paul Kagame in 10 lines or less.”  The answer to 
this query should depend not only on the topic (Paul Kagame) but also on the 
interest the user has on the topic. A historian interested in Kagame may be 
interested in his early childhood, while a State Department African policy expert 
may have no interest in this. We develop a model of stories that can be extracted 
from text sources and that are parameterized by user interest. The user specifies his 
level of interest in various attributes of the topic and the goal of the system is to 
create a story that (i) maximizes interest to the user, and (ii) minimizes repetition, 
and (iii) maximizes continuity in the story. The formal framework generates such 
stories. We also have results of experiments conducted on the utility of the 
framework. The work was done jointly with M. Albanese, C. Cesarano, M. 
Fayzullin, and A. Picariello. 
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Reid Swanson, ICT,  University of Southern California 
Encoding the common-sense knowledge, in a machine-readable format, that 
enables the level of reasoning power to support a person’s ability to tell compelling 
stories is a daunting task. In the spirit of Open Mind we believe allowing authors to 
engineer this knowledge in natural language is a critical component to covering the 
wide scope of human activities. However, we also believe that much of this 
knowledge is being spontaneously volunteered to the web in the form of personal 
weblog diaries. As of 2008 Technorati.com reports that nearly 1 million weblogs 
are authored every day and over 133 million have been indexed since 2002. From 
our own research, somewhere between 5-17% of these weblogs are individuals 
telling personal stories about their lives. These stories are an invaluable resource 
that contains all sorts of temporal and causal knowledge about peoples’ activities, 
relationships and thoughts. Our system leverages the vast repository of stories 
found on the web, in a surprisingly simple way, but is still capable of enabling a 
real-time interactive storytelling system, in which a human and computer 
collaborate to write a narrative together.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: A sample narrative analysis (Swanson 2008) 
Emmett Tomai, Department of Computer Science, University of Texas Pan 
American 
Understanding narrative is a hallmark of human communication, and a difficult, 
long standing challenge for artificial intelligence.  Even the question of what it 
means to understand a narrative has fragmented and often unclear answers.  In 
recent work we have focused on pragmatic reasoning tasks over narrative text to 
1) If I t 2) I ld h t k b t th l ith 3) b t was smar  wou ave a en my ag on o e p ane w  me u
instead I figured that there wouldn't be room in the overhead for my 
suitcase. 4) I was wrong 5) and because I was wrong my bag wasn't gate 
checked 6) it went straight to baggage claim. 7) So here I wait for my bag to 
arrive 8) instead of on my way to my hotel for bed.
contains(plane,overhead)
volume(overhead)
ol me(bag)
Itwasputonthe I got off the planev u
volume(bag)<volume(overhead)
wrongflight.
5.5
    .
6a
3 4 5 6
1
~
~
7
0
5.5
Abaggagehandlerput
my bag on the plane (and off again)
2 8
Possibleevent Actualevent
       .
Explicit Implicit
5a
 30
provide a clear account of some different facets of narrative understanding.  We 
have used cognitive models of decision-making and blame attribution in response 
to narrative stimuli, as well as a heuristic model of identifying the intended morals 
of fable narratives.  These reasoning tasks provide a well-defined context for 
exploring narrative representation issues and the impact of pragmatic concerns on 
the semantic interpretation process.  Key challenges include the need for broad 
commonsense knowledge, highly structured event representations and the necessity 
of representing nested hypothetical situations (e.g. utterances, possible or 
conditional futures, etc).  We have built a natural language understanding system, 
EA NLU, that is capable of generating such knowledge-rich, highly expressive 
logical representations by using pragmatic constraints to guide and control the 
interpretation process.  EA NLU integrates the ResearchCyc knowledge base 
contents, compositional frame semantics with delayed disambiguation, discourse 
representation theory and abductive reasoning.  This is joint work with Ken 
Forbus. 
Bart Verheij, Department of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen 
Argumentation Schemes, Stories & Legal Evidence: A Computational 
Perspective  Imagine yourself in court, having to defend your innocence of a 
serious crime. Let's suppose that your defense fails, and you end up behind bars. 
Was it your – probably imperfect – control of formal argumentation techniques 
that made you lose? Or, was the problem more a matter of the content of the stories 
you told, such as your unconvincing alibi? The starting point of the project 
“Making sense of evidence: Software support for crime investigations” was that 
both argumentative and narrative elements are relevant when deciding about the 
facts in a criminal case. Whereas arguments allow for the careful assessment of 
individual pieces of evidence, stories give insight into the quality of the overall 
picture of a case and help to avoid tunnel vision. A result of the project is a hybrid 
theory of argumentation with stories, thereby showing that previous argument-
based and story-based approaches can be naturally combined. The project has 
taken inspiration from developments in the design of argumentation support 
software and from argumentation schemes research in the field of argumentation 
theory. 
Patrick H. Winston, CSAIL, MIT 
I believe storytelling and understanding is the defining competence of human-level 
intelligence, and that competence, in turn, rests on human language.  Language 
gives us words, which enable indexing, and language gives us descriptions, which 
enable analogy. 
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There is more to the story, however.  In the Genesis project, we aim to understand 
how descriptions enable what Minsky calls self reflective thinking in his book, The
Emotion Machine.  We also aim to understand how language marshals the 
resources of perceptual systems that solve problems not readily solved 
symbolically.  And we also aim to understand how language enables us humans to 
imagine situations we have never witnessed before, so that we can use 
linguistically and visually imagined situations as surrogates for direct experience.  
We believe all these abilities are essential not just to storytelling and understanding 
but also to a full understanding of human intelligence. 
In the story understanding dimension, we have built the Genesis system, which 
features more than a dozen representational experts coupled with the ability to use 
background commonsense knowledge to fill in gaps.  In Figure 13, the Genesis 
system displays its interpretation of a very brief rendering of the Macbeth story, 
showing in white boxes that which is explicit in the story, in gray boxes that which 
was inferred using commonsense knowledge, and in pink and yellow, an instance 
of a higher-level notion, “revenge,” discovered by a program based on Wendy 
Lehnert's plot-unit research. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Screenshot of the Genesis System 
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R. Michael Young, Department of Computer Science, North Carolina State 
University 
Research in the Liquid Narrative Group  I seek to build an generative 
computational model of narrative that is informed both the strong history of prior 
analytical work in both cognitive psychology and narrative theory.  Breaking 
narrative into distinct story and discourse elements, I build on existing AI 
approaches to reasoning about action and communication to generate interactions 
within 3D virtual worlds that should be readily understood as narratives by users.  
My group has specifically focused on elements of story generation that target 
narrative phenomena such as character intentionality, suspense, surprise and 
expectation.  At the discourse level, we have developed methods for the automatic 
generation of cinematic camera control for narratives told in 3D worlds. Our work 
on interactivity in narrative environments has produced methods for analyzing and 
dynamically adapting stories in response to user activity. Central to this work are 
three key concepts.  First, that the development of precise, generative 
computational models of narrative must be informed by ideas drawn from a range 
of inherently non-computational, semi-formal disciplines.  Second, that narrative is 
ultimately in the head of the consumer – that is, the ultimate design criteria for 
narrative artifacts rest in the cognitive and affective responses they prompt in their 
human consumers.  And finally, existing models of narrative must be extended and 
adapted to account for new modes of narrative in which user interactivity takes 
center stage. 

